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STATE IMMUNITY AND FEDERAL JUDICIAL
POWER-RETREAT FROM NATIONAL SUPREMACY
FREDERIC S. LE CLERcQ*

The question of an uncontesting state's amenability to suit has long been
troublesome, giving rise to a number of legal doctrines. Suits to restrain unconstitutional action threatened by individuals who are state officers have consistently been allowed in the federal courts upon the fiction that such suits are
not actions against the state.' This fiction has been repeatedly reexamined and
reaffirmed.2 Equitable relief in the form of restitutions and mandatory injunctions4 has also been approved against state officers, despite a substantial impact
upon state treasuries.
Claims that impose treasury liability are especially sensitive because of their
potentially disruptive impact upon state fiscal policy. When such claims arise
out of federal law or are litigated in the federal courts, they often raise critical
questions for ultimate resolution in the United States Supreme Court regarding the distribution of power between federal and state governments. When
state officers violate federal law, it is well established.that, upon complaint by
the United States, federal courts have the power to fashion effective equitable
remedies despite the effect upon state treasuries.5 In such instances the state
fiscal interests are subordinated to the paramount interest in the enforcement
of federal law.
Traditionally, claims upon the state treasury by bondholders have not been
permitted in federal courts of original jurisdiction without the consent of the
state.8 Such claims do not "arise under" federal law within the meaning of
article III of the United States Constitution; rather, they arise under state
statutes or contract law, and federal review can be exercised only upon the
judgment of a state court of -last resort.7 To the extent that private rights
against the state are "not given by contract, but by statute:"there is no contract to be impaired and, thus, no violation of the Contract Clause of article I,
section 10 for state repeal of statutory entitlement.8 No vital federal interest is
*A.B. 1959, University of South Carolina; MA. 1960, Fletcher School of Law and Diplo-

macyi LL.B. 1963, Duke University; Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee.
1. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
2. See cases cited in Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 304 nn.14-15
(1952).

3. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 871 (1824).
4. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
5. See Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355 (1966) (refund of
state taxes unlawfully imposed upon a federal instrumentality).
6. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
7. Cf. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211
U.S. 149 (1908).
8. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, i12 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting).
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impaired by recognition that those who do business with a state do so at their
own risk.
Federal courts have also adopted a policy of noninterference in the enforcement of state laws where there is an express remedial procedure provided in
state courts.9 It has long been established that the state courts are the appropriate tribunals for resolution of questions arising under their local law,
whether statutory or otherwiseo Since state law questions are likely to predominate in state tax litigation, federal deference to state forums is dearly
appropriate in this context. Review by the Supreme Court" is sufficient to
satisfy any residual federal interest in state tax policy.
Although the sensitivity of treasury liability has also been recognized in
damage actions against the state, the trend has been to allow recovery premised
upon an implied waiver of state immunity. 2 The state immunity doctrine has
been criticized, 13 but judicial recognition of states' common law immunity
from liability for damages intrudes upon no legitimate federal interest.
The effect of prior case law has been to make the eleventh amendment 4 or
the alleged state immunity postulate of article III irrelevant in most federal
question cases brought against officers of a state by the citizens thereof. However, two recent cases, Employees of Department of Public Health & Welfare v.
Department of Public Health & Welfare"' and Edelman v. Jordany"have cast
the state immunity doctrine in constitutional terms and, as a result, the
eleventh amendment has assumed renewed vitality. Earlier cases to which the
state immunity bar had been extended can be explained by the presence of
special state interests and the lack of special federal interests. Employees and
Edelman present important federal claims that arise under acts of Congress and
are, thus, distinguishable from earlier cases in which state immunity claims
were approved.
The effect of the holdings in Employees and Edelman is either to deny
private enforcement of federal rights or to deny a federal forum of original
9. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946); Ford Motor Co.
v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S.
47 (1944).
10. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 1 (20 Wall.) 590, 626-32 (1875).
11. Supreme Court review of decisions by the highest court of a state is permitted
where impairment of a federal right is asserted. 28 U.S.C. §1257 (1971).
12. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge
Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959); cf. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381
(1939) (authority to sue and be sued contained in a federal charter granted a government
corporation held broad enough to include suits in torts).
13. See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HAav. L.
REv. 1 (1963).
14. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, §9; cf. Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 294 n.9 (1973) (Marshall, J., joined by Stewart,

J., concurring).
16.
17.

411 U.S. 279 (1973).
Edelman v. Jordan, 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974).
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jurisdiction in federal question cases, a result that could cause substantial
dilution of federal rights. One of the most important roles of lower federal
courts is the vindication of federal rights. The ultimate exposition of federal
rights by the Supreme Court, important as it is, does not diminish the need
for access to lower federal courts for vindication, which often turns more upon
the establishment of an adequate record - a factual inquiry - than upon the

legal content of the asserted right. Review of the record by the Supreme Court
can never be an adequate substitute for access to a sympathetic forum of
original jurisdiction. Moreover, the burgeoning Supreme Court docket makes
it unrealistic to assume that the Court could adequately fulfill its role as the
expositor of federal law if its responsibilities for factfinding or review of
factfinding were significantly increased.
The denial of the obligatory character of federal rights prior to entry of a
court decree enforcing those rights portends even more ominous difficulties for
the enforcement of federal law. The vastness of our nation makes it unrealistic to impose exclusive enforcement responsibilities upon the various
federal agencies except in situations where the Congress plainly indicates an
intent to preclude individual access to the courts. In the welfare area "[r]ecent
studies suggest that there may be massive noncompliance by the states with the
federal requirements."' 8 Any denial of a right to private enforcement undermines the salutary trend toward judicial acceptance of the vital role of "private
litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the law."'19
Thus, the implications of Employees and Edelman are far reaching indeed, and deserve careful consideration. The purpose of this article will be to
consider both cases in the context of social welfare policy and the asserted
state immunity postulates of article Il and the eleventh amendment.
STATE IMMUNITY DoCrRINE

Employees of Department of PublicHealth & Welfare v.
Department of PublicHealth & Welfare
In Employees state hospital and school employees sought overtime compensation under section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act 20 (FLSA) and
an equal amount as liquidated damages and attorneys' fees. 21 The district
court dismissed the complaint and the court of appeals, sitting en banc,
affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the eleventh
amendment barred the federal claim. The Court declined to extend the waiver
exception to the state immunity doctrine22 "to every exercise by Congress of
18. Tomlinson & Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. Ray. 600, 666 (1972).
19. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 890 U.S. 400, 401 (1968). For an excellent
treatment of the right to counsel fees in actions initiated by "private attorneys general," see
King 8- Plater, The Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest Environmental Litigation, 41
TENN.L. REv. 27, 48-56 (1973).
20. 45 U.S.C. §§51 et seq. (Supp. I1, 1973) [hereinafter cited as FLSA].
21. 29 U.S.C. §216(b) (1970); 411 U.S. at 281.
22. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 877 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (when the State of Alabama
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its commerce power." 23 The Court's conclusions are disturbing for several
reasons. First, no reasonably ascertainable standard for establishing when
waivers of state immunity will be implied is articulated. The Court appears to
have been influenced by "how pervasive such a new federal scheme of regulation would be."2 4 The substantial fiscal impact of a decision adverse to the
state on Employees was contrasted with the "rather isolated state activity"
found in Pardon v. Terminal Railway of Alabama,25 where a waiver of immunity was implied from state operation of a railroad in interstate commerce.
Certainly, the level of state activity in the operation of railroads nowhere approximates the level of state involvement in the operation of schools and
hospitals. The operation of railroads is plainly peripheral to state governmental interests; being as proprietary as any conceivable state enterprise. By
considering the impact of a particular program on state government the Court
apparently draws the line between state governmental functions, which are
immunized from federal judicial scrutiny, and proprietary functions for which
there is no immunity from federal judicial review. But "economic impact"
analysis, while conservative of the resources of the Court politically, is utterly
lacking in predictive value. Moreover, the immunity doctrine insulates state
government from accountability for state administered school and hospital
programs whose employees may be objects of special federal concern.
The Court's efforts to distinguish Employees from Parden on a governmental-proprietary basis26 were unfortunate because "when acting within a
delegated power, [the federal government] may override countervailing state
interests whether these be described as 'governmental' or 'proprietary' in
character." 27 Several years ago in Maryland v. Wirtz 28 the Court upheld FLSA

coverage of state and local school and hospital employees as being within the
commerce clause grant of power to Congress. If the characterization of the governmental activity as "propietary or governmental" was spurious for determining the extent of the Commerce power in Wirtz, why should it be relevant in
Employees for determining the scope of federal judicial power? Wirtz suggests
that the Court in Employees construed too narrowly the extent of the judicial
power under article III. To deny federal jurisdiction on constitutional grounds
over subjects admittedly within the regulatory purview of Congress is regretbegan operation of an interstate railroad 20 years after the enactment of the Federal Employees Liability Act, it "necessarily consented to such suit as was authorized by that Act");
Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959) (state waiver of immunity
for a maritime tort inferred from congressional consent to an interstate compact).

23. 411 U.S. at 287.
24. Id. at 285.
25. 377 U.S. 184 (1964). In Employees the Court was concerned because a decision adverse to the state "may well implicate elevator operators, janitors, charwomen, security guards,
secretaries, and the like in every office building in a State's governmental hierarchy." 411 U.S.
at 285.

26. 411 U.S. at 281-85.
27. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195 (1968).
28. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). In Wirtz the Court upheld the constitutionality of the extension
of the FLSA to every employee in an enterprise engaged in commerce and the minimum
wage amendments extending coverage to service employees of state public schools, hospitals,
and related institutions.
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table. The right of Congress to provide a federal remedy for impairment of a
federal right should not be denied lightly, especially where, as here, the federal
court can afford a nonhostile forum for the establishment of complicated
questions of fact upon which the vindication of federal law depends. The extension of the judicial power under article III to cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties "enables the judicial department to receive jurisdiction to the full extent of the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States when any question respecting them shall assume such a form that the
judicial power is capable of acting on it." 2 9 Employees limits the federal
judicial power with regard to FLSA claims against state institutions when exercised by courts of original jurisdiction but, presumably, not when exercised
by the Supreme Court under United States Code, volume 28, section 1257.30
There are valid reasons for the Congress to withhold federal jurisdiction over
some cases to which the federal judicial power extends, especially where questions of state law are likely to predominate. 31 However, federal rather than
state questions dominate both FLSA and welfare litigation. The need for access to a federal factfinding forum free from potential bias or parochialism is
32
especially compelling when the defendant is the state itself.
The Court also established a presumption in Employees that contradicts an
important right secured by the Judiciary Act of March 3, 187533 - a federal
29. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824) (emphasis
added). Chief Justice Marshall's conclusion was derived from the premise commonly accepted by the framers of the Constitution:
"Mhe legislative, executive, and judicial powers, of every well-constructed government,
are co-extensive with each other; that is, they are potentially co-extensive. The executive
department may constitutionally execute every law which the legislature may constitutionally
make, and the judicial department may receive from the legislature the power of construing
every such law. All governments which are not extremely defective in their organization,
must possess, within themselves, the means of expounding, as well as enforcing, their own
laws."

.- Id. at 818-19; accord, 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES 469 (1836) (remarks of Mr. Wilson of Pennsylvania).
".
30. There have been other instances in which- cases outside the original federal question
.jurisdiction have been subject to review in the Supreme Court upon the final state decision.
For example, compare Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), with Louisville &
N.R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911).
31. Consider, for example, the avalanche of western land litigation that threatened to
overwhelm the federal courts at the turn of the century and the congressional response. See
Union Pac. Ry. v. Myers, 115 U.S. 1 (1885); 28 U.S.C. §349 (Supp. 11, 1973). Cf. Gully v,
First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 116 (1936); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505,
507 (1900).
32. Congressional authority to establish "inferior tribunals . .. dispersed throughout the

Republic" was based in part upon the fear of "biased directions of . .. dependent [state]
Judge[s] . .. or the local prejudices of an undirected jury." 1 THE R.coRDs OF THE FEDERAL

CONVENTION OF 1787, at 124 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (Mr. Madison of Virginia) [hereinafter
cited as RxcoRDs].
33. 18 Stat. 470, pt. 3 (1875). Federal jurisdiction of question arising under the laws,
constitution, and treaties is vested in the federal courts, among other places, by 28 U.S.C.
§1331 (1970) ($10,000 jurisdictional amount) and 28 U.S.C. §1343 (1970) (without regard to
jurisdictional amount). See, e.g., F. FRANKrURTEn & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT 65 (1928); M. HART & H. WEcHsLs.R, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEEraL SYsTEM
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forum of original jurisdiction for cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States. 34 Access to a federal forum of original jurisdiction enhances important constitutional values: vindication of federal claims
by judges who are institutionally free from the parochial restraints of state
courts, many of whose members are subject to popular election; 35 adjudication
of federal claims by judges with specialized knowledge in federal law because
of the relative frequency with which they are called upon to hear federal
claims; consideration of federal claims by judges of superior competence who
are attracted to federal rather than state judgeships because of the generally
greater prestige, emoluments, and perquisites of the federal bench. Ironically,
the majority in Employees would bar the door of the federal courts to FLSA
claims against state hospitals and schools despite its acknowledgement that
"[s]ection 16(b) ... authorizes employee suits in 'any court of competent jurisdiction.' "3 The awkward effect of the Court's decision is to shuttle citizens
with federal statutory claims to the state courts to seek relief. Despite the obligation of state courts to enforce federal law3 7 and the possibility of ultimate
federal review of federal claims adjudicated in the state courts, 38 denial of a
844-50 (Bator, Mishkin, Shapiro & Wechsler eds. 1973); Note, Federal jurisdiction Over
Challenges to State Welfare Programs,72 COLUm. L. REV. 1404 (1972).

34. See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528
(1965). But cf. Railroad Comm'r v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941) and its progeny, discussed
in C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §52, at 196 (2d ed. 1970).
35. See R. BURKE, THE PATH TO THE COURT: A STUDY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
(1959). The institutional independence of the federal judge from parochial pressure is exemplified by district judges such as Frank Johnson of Alabama and Robert Merhige of
Virginia. J. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DE-

SEGREGATION (1961). The supervisory power of federal appellate courts along with the
distaste of judges for being reversed combine to make federal district courts preferred forums
for the assertion of federal claims. State trial judges, at least psychologically, are insulated
from federal accountability by intermediate appellate state courts. Unfortunately, some federal judges are also heavily influenced by parochial values and local social pressures despite their greater institutional independence. Parochialism among federal judges is probably attributable largely to two factors: the political selectivity implicit in accession to the
federal judiciary, and conformity relating to the personal aspirations of individual federal
judges for social acceptability and approbation.
36. 411 U.S. at 287. The Court admits that "[a]rguably . . . [§16(b)] permits suit in the
Missouri courts but that is a question we need not reach." (emphasis added). Id.
37. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); cf. Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 188 (1944)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
38. 28 U.S.C. §1257 (Supp. II, 1973) provides: Final judgments or decrees rendered by
the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court as follows: (1) by appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty
or statute of the United States and the decision is against its validity; (2) by appeal, where
is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in
favor of its validity; (3) by writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of
the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in
question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed
under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised
under, the United States.
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federal forum of original jurisdiction to secure rights conferred by federal
statute appreciably dilutes the rights of national citizenship.
Actually, the Court does not establish an eleventh amendment limitation
on the power of Congress to confer jurisdiction of FLSA claims against the
states upon the federal courts. Rather, the Court presumes that Congress did
not intend to confer federal jurisdiction of FLSA claims against state institutions,39 thus rejecting the rule Chief Justice Marshall attributed to the founding fathers -that legislative creation of rights presumes coextensive judicial
authority to expound and protect those rights. 40 The basis for this conclusion
that congressional imposition of "new or even enormous fiscal burdens on the
States" may not be presumed from congressional silence, 41 appears contrary to
fact. It is obvious that the extension of coverage to state employees could not
be presumed absent clear evidence of legislative intent.42 Nevertheless, if Congress in fact intended "to put the States 'on the same footing as other employers,' "43 the creation of federal rights should, absent clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary, presume access to a federal forum for their assertion. 44 The Court should not presume, as it did in Employees, that the Congress creates substantive federal rights without authorizing an effective federal remedy for their enforcement.
There is little basis for the Court's conclusion that congressional authorization of suits for unpaid wages or overtime by the Secretary of Labor establishes that "private enforcement of the Act was not a paramount objective."45
In fact, administrative enforcement of federal statutes geared to patterns of
89. 411 U.S. at 285. The Court "found not a word in the history of the 1966 amendments to indicate a purpose of Congress to make it possible for a citizen of that State or
another State to sue the State in the federal Courts." Id. There is also not the slightest indication in Employees that Congress intended to bar access to federal courts to enforce
compliance with federal standards. Compare 411 U.S. 299, with Rosado v. Wyman, 897 U.S.
897, 422-28 (1970).
Mr. Justice Brennan's analysis of congressional intent is more convincing than the
Court's. He emphasizes that §16(b) was expressly extended to "'[a]ny employer' covered by
the Act" and that the Senate explicitly declared its intent to extend coverage to institutions
"'whether public or private or operated for profit or not for profit.'" 411 U.S. at 802 n.1
(emphasis added). See S. REP,. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966).
40. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
41. 411 U.S. at 284-85.
42. There was ample evidence of such intent. See id. at 801-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
By §8(d) of the Act "employer" was first defined to exclude the United States or any state
or political subdivision. In 1966 an "except" clause was added to §3(d), which extended the
Act to state hospitals and schools. The Court admitted that "[b]y reason of the literal
language of the present Act, Missouri and the departments joined as defendants are constitutionally covered by the Act." Id. at 283.
43. Id. at 801.
44. See Rosado v. Wyman, 897 U.S. 897, 420 (1970): "We are most reluctant to assume
Congress has closed the avenue of effective judicial review to those individuals most directly
affected by the administration of its program."
45. 411 U.S. at 286. But cf. Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 288
(1929). Botany Mills was cited with approval in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National
Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 94 S. Ct. 690 (1974), wherein the Court found that Congress'
specification of a remedy impliedly negatived the availability of other remedies. See text accompanying note 78 infra.
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noncompliance generally either complements or supplements individual enforcement.46 Authorization of individual remedies often enhances administrative enforcement by disclosing patterns of nonconformity that deserve administrative attention. Moreover, it is highly questionable for the Court to imply
that if the Congress finds a need for administrative enforcement of a statute, it
is obliged to create a bureaucracy so vast that individual remedies are unnecessary. 47 For these reasons, the Court's presumption that administrative
enforcement precludes individual remedies does not ring true.
The most plausible explanation of Employees derives from the Court's
"pursuit of harmonious federalism," 48 through which it infuses its ethical and
political values into the decision. Political and ethical values, of course, elude
rational criticism. One can only identify such values, explore their social implications, and characterize the "style" of the Court by its ethical postulates. The
Court's value perspective in Employees emerges not as one of restraint, a popular characterization, but rather as one of deference to state fiscal interests
over both national enforcement interests and the individual interests of the
working poor. The irony is that Mr. Justice Douglas is sounding the call 49 and
Mr. Justice Marshall is willing, with some reservations, to agree. Mr. Justice
Brennan alone was willing to accord the national enforcement interests and
individual interests of the working poor the respect that Congress intended
they have.
In Employees the Court subordinated enforcement of minimum wage
legislation affecting state employees to the assumed value of federal restraint
in the "delicate federal-state relationship," 50 at least to the extent that state
compliance with the FLSA cannot be effected either voluntarily or through
the intervention of the Secretary of Labor. But the Department of Labor is
46. Consider, for example, the complementary character of individual action for relief
against employment discrimination under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with
commissioner complaints directed at whole industries (such as textiles) or patterns of discrimination in particular companies. Consider, also, that the right of HEW in administration of the categorical assistance programs to secure state conformity with federal statutes,
regulations, and the United States Constitution through the "drastic" device of state conformity hearings does not preclude individual remedies in the federal courts. 397 U.S. at 422.
47. The Court protested that judicial deference to the alleged state immunity does "not
make the extension of coverage to state employees meaningless." 411 U.S. at 285-86. Suits by
the Department of Labor against nonconforming states would not present state immunity
obstacles. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892) (original jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court for suits by the United States against a state); United States v. California, 328
F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1964) (original jurisdiction in the district courts of civil action by the
United States against a state). But the Solicitor General, as amicus curiae advised the court
that "less than 4% of ... establishments [covered by FLSA] can be investigated by the Secretary of Labor each year." 411 U.S. at 287. Because 45.4 million workers were covered by
FLSA in 1971 a state-immunity bar to individual relief severely frustrates the remedial
purposes of the statute.
48. 411 U.S. at 286.
49. The position of Justice Douglas in Employees may be explained by his belief that
the "political processes rather than equal protection litigation . . . [must be] the ultimate
solvent of [the 'enormous' problems of medical care]. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County,
94 S. Ct. 1076, 1090 (1974) (Douglas, J., in separate opinion) (footnote omitted).
50. 411 U.S. at 286.
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already very busy, and its officers serve at the pleasure of the administration
and are subject to powerful political constraints. Administrative enforcement
of federally secured rights against state institutions would understandably be
a "delicate" political matter for the Secretary of Labor, as evidenced by the
protracted negotiations required to obtain state compliance with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) categorical assistance programs. One probable effect of the Court's decision in Employees is to denigrate
the entitlement of state employees from "now" to a time frame holding out the
hope of future compliance, since FLSA claims for back wages presumably
would be precluded by Edelman. The interest of state hospital and school
employees in securing the wages to which they are entitled by federal law,
although not "fundamental" in a constitutional sense, 51- is both immediate and
compelling. One wonders whether the Court's "pursuit of harmonious fed-.
eralism" is worth the price- it exacts from the 2.7 -million anonymous em- .
ployees of state hospitals and schools.
Striking a proper balance among conflicting national ,state, and individual
interests is admittedly one of the most difficult and-important of -the Court's
functions. The supremacy clause of article VI, 5 2 however, establishes important
limitations upon the Court's deference to state interests, at least when the
Congress is acting within the proper scope of its delegated powers. 53 The
supremacy clause and the respect the Court owes Congress as a coordinate
branch of government should function as important restraints upon the Court's
subordination of national to state interests. The Court' federalism postulate
has left a judicial gloss on the FLSA inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause.
It may often be appropriate for the Court to construe congressional grants
of judicial power more narrowly than the scope of power available under
article III,54 even though the congressional grant uses the language of article
III. The same language used in different contexts may take on quite different
meanings. 55 Whenever substantial federal interests are not involved, the GoldWashing/Gully line of authority is appropriate. But the doctrine of GoldWashing and Gully is not appropriate to cases such as Employees or Edelman,
precisely because the two latter cases implicate vital questions of policy under
remedial federal legislation. In searching for an answer to whether federal
jurisdiction should prevail over eleventh amendment objections, the Court
might look for analogies to the Erie doctrinesG and approach the problem from
51. Compare Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) and Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970), with Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
52. U.S. CONST. art. VI, 112provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
53. See Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971); note 116 infra.
54. See, e.g., Gold-Washing 8&Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 (1877) and cases cited
note 31 supra."
1-,55. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 678 (1950). But cf. Forrester, Federal Question Jurisdictionand Section 5, 18 TULANE L, REv. 263 (1943).
56. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U,S. 64 (1938).
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a perspective similar to that of the Court in Hanna v. Plumer.57 The aptness
of the Erie analogy arises from the pervasive concern with federalism common
to cases involving the eleventh amendment and Erie doctrine. In Hanna, the
Court held that the Rules of Enabling Act of 193451 rather than the Rules of
Decision Act of 178959 controls the validity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As a result, conflicts between specific Federal Rules and state law in
the future are likely to be resolved in favor of the Federal Rules. 60 Yet there
remain substantial areas of primary activity in which state law will prevail,
consistent with the Rules of Decision Act of 1789 and the Erie doctrine.
Similarly, states need not be amenable to process in the federal courts for
actions sounding in tort, contract, or otherwise arising under the laws of the
states. If the claim arises under an Act of Congress, however, the federal law
rather than the eleventh amendment should define the scope of federal judicial
power. Federal judicial power, in the absence of an expression of congressional
intent to the contrary should be coextensive with federal legislative power.
Employees and Edelman are disturbing also because they frustrate the development of federal common law by the lower federal courts in substantive
areas in which it is particularly appropriate for the interstitial law to be federal rather than local.61 The need for a uniform, federal common law consistent with the purposes of the FLSA and categorical assistance laws would
appear equally compelling with the recognized need for a uniform federal
62
common law governing labor contracts.
Edelman v. Jordan
In Edelman v. Jordan6- the Court held that state immunity barred an
action under the assistance program for the aged, blind, and disabled (AABD)
for benefits that had been withheld in violation of federal regulations 64 prior
to the date of a judicial decree ordering state officers to comply with the applicable federal regulations.65 The Court, therefore, set aside the retroactive
57. See 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
58. 28 U.S.C. §2072 (1970).
59. 28 U.S.C. §1652 (1970).
60. See Ely, The IrrepessibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974).
61. See, e.g., D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 471-72
(1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
62. See Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
Cf. Cousins v. Wigoda, 95 S. Ct. 541, 548-49 (1975); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398 (1964); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
63. 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974).
64. Applicable federal regulations required eligibility determination and payment within
30 days of application for the blind and aged and within 45 days for the disabled. Id. at
1351. For subsequent changes in the federal regulations, see 45 C.F.R. §§206.l0(a)(1)-(6) (1973).
65. Edelman thus leaves undisturbed any prospective relief based upon state noncompliance with federal regulations subsequent to the district court's "permanent injunction requiring compliance with federal time limits." Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 988 (7th Cir.
1973). HEW had sought passage of a bill in the 91st Congress that would have given it
authority to require retroactive payments to eligible persons denied such benefits, but the
bill failed to pass the House of Representatives. 94 S. Ct. at 1351 n.16. Accord, Rodriguez v.
Swank, 496 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 95 S. Ct. 151 (1974).
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portion of the district court's order that directed state officials "to 'release and
remit AABD benefits wrongfully withheld to all [eligible] applicants... who
applied between July 1, 1968 [the date of federal regulations] and April
16, 197[1] [the date of the preliminary injunction issued by the District
Court] ....
"66
Edelman limited cases permitting equitable relief against
state officers, such as Ex parte Young.67 Equitable restitution against state
officers does not appear possible under Edelman and claimants have been
limited to "prospective injunctive relief,"68 despite the Court's admissions that
time limitations established by federal regulations were an "'appropriate
interpretation of the Congressional mandate of reasonable promptness' 69 and
that state officers had patently violated the federal regulations.
The cases granting equitable relief against state officials do not readily
admit to the shackle imposed by Edelman. Ex parte Young on its facts afforded redress for past wrongs. There, a federal circuit court had issued a
preliminary injunction, upon the suit of railroad stockholders, to restrain
compliance with a Minnesota statute reducing railroad rates, allegedly in
violation of the Federal Constitution. Although the federal circuit court enjoined Young from instituting any proceeding to enforce the Minnesota rate
law he filed a petition for mandamus in state court directing the railroads to
comply with the state statute. The federal circuit court then adjudged Young
to be in contempt, whereupon he filed an original application in the Supreme
Court for leave to file a petition for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari. The
Court recognized that the central question was whether the suit was, in effect,
one against the State of Minnesota and thus not cognizable in the federal
court. The Court held that Young was amenable to federal process under the
fiction that state officers are stripped of their official or representative character, and thus their immunity when they act in violation of the Federal Constitution. Likewise, it would appear that the state officers in Edelman who
violated a lawful act of Congress and lawful regulations promulgated thereunder would, under the Supremacy Clause, be stripped of their representative
character and immunity.
In Rosado v. Wyman70 the Court compelled compliance with a cost of
living adjustment for welfare recipients required of the states as a condition
for continued participation in the federally supported Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program. To deny redress in Rosado-type actions
for past wrongful deprivations by state officers undermines the obligatory
character of federal law, subverts the intention of Congress, and encourages
state nonconformity with federal norms. The states are legally free to par66.

94 S. Ct. at 1352. It is misleading to describe the disapproved portion of the district

court's order as retroactive. The federal obligation upon the states emanates from valid
federal regulations, which the courts are called upon to enforce, not from the enforcement
decree itself. This case is clearly distinguishable from cases in which judicial decisions declaratory of asserted, but theretofore nonrecognized, rights are given prospective application
only.

67.
68.
69.
70.

209 U.S. 123 (1908).
94 S. Ct. at 1362.
Id. at 1354 n.8.
397 US. 397 (1970).
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ticipate or decline to participate in the AFDC program; if they elect to accept
the benefits they should not be permitted to withhold funds to which recipients
are entitled by federal law.
Unfortunately, Edelman dilutes the most effective sanction reinforcing the
obligatory character of an entire class of federally secured rights. It establishes
fiscal incentives for states to abrogate or delay the implementation of important federal rights, limited only by the possible personal accountability of
state officers for their past wrongful acts.7 1 In his dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas
suggests that the retroactive-prospective gloss that Edelman placed on Ex parte
Young "is not relevant or material because the result in every welfare case
coming here is to increase or reduce the financial responsibility of the participating state."72 Indeed, the Court admitted that there was no "day and
night" difference between the fiscal impact upon state treasuries of prospective

71. Personal liability of public officers for deprivations of federal rights is beyond the
scope of this article. However, neither the eleventh amendment nor the doctrine of "executive
immunity" establish an absolute immunity for public officers. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 94 S.Ct.
1683, 1687 (1974). Moore v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961); cf. Bivins v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Personal liability does not afiord an adequate alternative remedy to the eleventh amendient barriers raised by Employees and Edelman for several reasons: (I) The "necessity of
permitting officials to perform their official functions free from the threat of suits for personal liability," Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra at 1688, assures that the immunity of public officers from personal liability, although not absolute, will be extensive. See Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Since the options that executive officers consider are broad and
subtle, their "range of discretion must be comparably broad." Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra at
1692. (2) Public officers are not generally persons of sufficient means to make personal liability a viable remedy, especially where entitlement may extend to thousands of citizens as is
true with FLSA, AABD, and other federal programs. Moore v. County of Alameda, supra at
700 n.10. (3) Federal funds available to states for retroactive, corrective payments to satisfy a
hearing decision or court order in the categorical assistance programs, see note 96 inIra,
could not be used to satisfy a personal judgment against a state officer. (4) It is uncertain
whether suits against public officers on their bonds would reach the civil deprivations in
Employees or Edelman, or that all of the responsible officers are bonded.
72. 94 S. Ct. at 1365 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377
U.S. 218, 233 (1964) (district court given authority to require supervisors of Prince Edward
County "to levy taxes . . . adequate to reopen . . . public school system"). Federal courts
must be able to give "complete rather than truncated justice." Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,
328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946). Distinctions between prospective and retrospective relief are untenable because retrospective relief is often "necessary to redress past wrong." Brief for Respondents at 26, n.16, Edelman v. Jordan, 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974). Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.
441 (1973) (refund of excess tuition wrongfully withheld by state officers). Equitable relief
against mental health and jail officials has also been approved despite the fact that affirmative
remedial action to redress the deprivation of federal rights often amounts to claims upon the
state treasury. See Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304, 306-07 (8th Cir. 1971); Wyatt v. Stickney,
344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971),
aff'd sub nor. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972). Equitable restitution against
state officers may often provide the only satisfactory relief. Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (a federal court of equity has the power to decree
restitution against a state treasurer who wrongfully levied taxes upon a federally chartered
bank; cf. Perez v. Ledesmna, 401 U.S. 82, 105-06 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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relief73 and the so-called retroactive relief sought in Edelman.7 4 The Court'sretroactive-prospective distinction is traceable to equitable- discretion rather
than to a distinction between suits at law and in equity under either the
eleventh amendment or article III. The basis for the distinction is doubtless
that prospective relief would afford the state the option of electing not to
receive federal funds rather than complying with federal regulations. But this
distinction ignores the fact that the state agreed to comply with federal law
and regulations when it initially elected to participate in the federally assisted
program.
The effect of Edelman upon continuing access to the federal courts by -welfare recipients and applicants is uncertain. After stating that Rosado "did not
purport to decide the eleventh amendment issue we resolve today,"7 5 the Court
declared:
The only language in the Social Security Act which. purports to provide
a federal sanction against a State which does not comply with federal requirements for the distribftion of fedleral moiiies is found in 42 U.S.C.
§1384... . This provision by its terms does riot authorize suit against
anyone, and standing alone, falls far short of
a waiver by a patricipating
70
State of its Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The Court's recent unanimous decision in Shea v. Vialpando77r which reaffirmed the right of individual access to the federal courts to secure conformity
with federal law is reassuring. In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.8
National Association of Railroad Passengers (Amtrak),7
however, the Court
applied strict principles of statutory construction, stating that when a statute
73. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 US. 365 (1971) (welfare officials prohibited from
denying welfare benefits to otherwise qualified aliens); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(recipients entitled to hearing prior to termination).
74. The Court asserted that Goldberg and Graham have only an "ancillary effect on the
state treasury [which] is a permissible and often inevitable consequence" of Ex parte Young,
94 S. Ct. at 1358.
75. Id. at 1362 n.18. The Court did not regard Rosado as controlling, "since the Court
was not faced with a district court judgment ordering retroactive payments nor with a
challenge based on the Eleventh Amendment." Id.
76. Id. at 1361. Compare the Court's unequivocal language in Edelman, with the Rosado
Court's "reluctance to assume Congress has closed the avenue of effective judicial review.". 397
U.S. at 420 (emphasis added). Rosado adhered to the premise that the state had "alternative
choices of assuming the additional cost [of compliance with federal requirements] or not
using federal funds to pay welfare benefits." Id .at 420-21 (emphasis added). Compliance of
participatingstates with federal law and regulations can be ordered but, ultimately, the
review power of the federal court is limited to prohibition of the use of federal funds by a
nonconforming state. See Mr. Justice Harlan's statement that a state is "in no way prohibited
from using only state funds according to whatever plan it chooses, providing it -violates no
provision of the Constitution ....
[But] petitioners are entitled to declaratory relief and an
appropriate injunction ...

against the payment of federal monies .

..

would the state not

develop a conforming plan within a reasonable period of time." Id. at 420 (emphasis in.
original).
"
77. 94 S. Ct. 1746 (1974) (Colorado standard $30 allowance for work expenses for AFDC
recipients invalidated because of inconsistence with 42 U.S.C. §602(a)(7):(1970)).
.
78.

94 S. Ct. 690 (1974).
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expressly provides a particular remedy courts should not imply the availability
of other remedies . The standing rationale of Rosado can be distinguished
from Amtrak upon two grounds: (1) the asserted interests in welfare cases,
although not "fundamental" in a constitutional sense, are deserving of greater
judicial solicitude than the less compelling interests of railroad passengers, 80
(2) the legislative history of the Amtrak Act bears substantial evidence of congressional intent that the Attorney General assume exclusive responsibility for
enforcement."' Recognition of the continuing vitality of Rosado is essential
because of its immense value in assuring compliance with federal law and
regulations.
The dissenters in Rosado asserted that "all judicial examinations of alleged
conflicts between state and federal ... programs prior to a final HEW decision
approving or disapproving the state plan are fundamentally inconsistent with
the enforcement scheme created by Congress and lence such suits should be
completely precluded."8 2 The state immunity doctrine of Edelman provides a
way for the Court to rid itself of the "countless lawsuits by welfare recipients" 83 without overruling Ex parte Young-a step that, as Mr. Justice
Douglas observed, none is eager to take.84 Were the Court to adopt the position
of the dissenters in Rosado, the precise questions of when and under what
circumstances welfare recipients could properly seek judicial review would re85
main to be settled.
Aggrieved welfare recipients are the most obvious complainants against
state noncompliance with federal regulations. Certainly AFDS recipients suffer
injury in fact and are within the zone of statutorily protected interests;86 thus,
they satisfy two of the three standing requirements of Data Processing Service
79. Id. at 693. The Court observed: "[Wjhen legislation expressly provides a particular
remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other
remedies. 'When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the
negative of any other mode.' Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 279 U.S. 282, 289 (1929)."
The Court held, over the lone dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas, that Amtrak passengers lacked
standing under §307(a) of the Amtrak Act, 45 U.S.C. §5477 (1970), to sue to enjoin alleged
discontinuance of a passenger train in violation of §404(a)(1) of the Act.
80. See, e.g., 397 U.S. 254 (1970); cf. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413
U.S. 508, 517 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring).
81. 94 S. Ct. at 695 n.9.
82. 397 U.S. at 453 (Black, J., joined by Burger, C.J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 433.
84. Edelman v. Jordan, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 1367 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
85. The statutory provisions for review by HEW of state AFDC plans "do not permit
private individuals, namely, present or potential welfare recipients, to initiate or participate
in . . . compliance hearings." Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. at 426 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Under the rationale of the dissenters in Rosado would private suits by present or potential
welfare recipients be appropriate only when refusal of the Secretary of HEW to act under
42 U.S.C. §1384-even though within the letter of his authority-went "beyond any rational
exercise of discretion?" See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 94 S. Ct. 690, 696-97 (Brennan, J., concurring). Compare Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d
1360 (3d Cir. 1974) (plaintiffs have standing and a right to declaratory judgment that
National Housing Act requires federal officers to make efforts to ascertain that insured
mortgages under §235 meet municipal housing code standards), with National R.R., supra.
86. See 42 U.S.C. §§601 et seq.
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Organizations,Inc. v. Camp.8 As to the third - that judicial review has not
been precluded - the test, where there is no express denial of judicial review,
is whether "nonreviewability can fairly be inferred." 's The authorization of
administrative enforcement under section 1384 should not preclude individual
standing to sue.89 Did Mr. Justice Douglas put his finger on the pulse of the
Court in Amtrak when he observed:
The Court is in the mood to close all possible doors to judicial review
so as to let the existing bureaucracies roll on to their goal of administrative absolutism. When the victims of administrative venality or administrative caprice are not allowed even to be heard, the abuses of the
monsters we have created will become intolerable.9 0
State participation in federal welfare programs is not required. 91 That a
state may elect "to refuse to comply with the federal requirement at the cost
of losing federal funds is, of course, a risk that any welfare plaintiff takes." 92
However:
As long as a State is receiving federal funds . . . it is under a legal requirement to comply with the federal conditions placed on the receipt
of those funds; and individuals who are adversely affected by the failure
of the State to comply with the federal requirements in distributing
those federal funds are entitled to a judicial determination of such a
claim.93
Political rather than legal constraints generally guarantee that states will continue to participate in the categorical assistance programs. Continued state
participation in a program should provide an adequate basis for implying a
waiver of immunity.
Under Edelman the adversely affected individual is denied the right to a
judicial determination of his claim for wrongfully withheld benefits. State
compliance with federal law and regulations is subverted. The individuals
injured by state noncompliance are forced to rely upon the good will of state
bureaucracy or protracted negotiation between federal and state bureaucracies.
87. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
88. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970).
89. As the Court observed in Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 (1969):
"The achievement of the Act's laudable goal could be severely hampered, however, if each
citizen were required to depend solely on litigation instituted at the discretion of the Attorney General. For example, the provisions of the Act extend to States and the subdivisions
thereof. The Attorney General has a limited staff and often might be unable to uncover
quickly new regulations and enactments passed at the varying levels of state government. It
is consistent with the broad purpose of the Act to allow the individual citizen standing to
insure that his city or county government complies with the §5 approval requirements."
(emphasis in original). To permit individual suits against cities and counties but not against
states is a metaphysical distinction that exalts form over substance.
90. 94 S. Ct. at 700 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
91. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).

92. 397 U.S. at 427 (Douglas, J., concurring).
93. Id.
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The door is also opened for political considerations to dilute individual rights
secured by law. Without private enforcement, the size and cost of the federal
bureaucracy inevitably increase. Yet it is doubtful in the context of the political
constraints upon HEW that state compliance with federal law and regulations
could ever be achieved as effectively as by private lawsuit. The Court's implicit
"pursuit of harmonious federalism" in Edelman threatens to undermine
drastically the accountability of state welfare agencies to the intended beneficiaries of federal monies. Denial of access to the federal courts will only increase disparity in powers between the state welfare agencies and the recipient
population. Edelman also places a premium on expeditious initiation of litigation and dilatory state tactics in the courts. Plaintiffs who can claim only from
the date of a decree have every reason to file early, while any state inclination
toward diligent litigation is abrogated.
In Edelman the Court overruled previous cases that had approved "retroactive" payments "to the extent that they are inconsistent with our holding
today."94 But not all retroactive relief is necessarily inconsistent with Edelman.
For example, in Shapiro v. Thornpson 5 where the Court affirmed an award of
retroactive welfare payments, the claim was based on the right to travel, a constitutional liberty secured by the fourteenth amendment, not a federal statutory claim as in Edelman. Edelman does not resolve the degree to which the
state's eleventh amendment immunity "may have been limited by the later enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that such a limitation is
necessary to effectuate the purposes of that Amendment ....-96
Three of the four dissenters in Edelman argued for allowing the claim
upon the ground of "implied waiver," 97- and the fourth, Justice Brennan, would
have disallowed state immunity because it was waived " 'in the plan of the
Convention' that formed the Union, at least insofar as the States granted Congress specifically enumerated powers." 9s8 The Brennan position has the superior
virtue of avoiding the state immunity doctrine when Congress acts within its
delegated powers. Even if one admits the viability of state immunity under our
"scheme of cooperative federalism,'' 90 however, there is persuasive evidence
that the states, by accepting matching federal funds, voluntarily assumed the
Act's requirements.111' Implied waiver is fully consistent with the "essentially
contractual agreement [states have] with the Federal government."10 1 Implied
94. 94 S. Ct. at 1360. These cases included Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 168 (1969), and
several cases summarily affirming district court orders awarding retroactive payments. Id. at
1359 n.13.
95. 394 U.S. 168 (1967).
96. 94 S. Ct. at 1371 n.2 (Marshall, J., joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting). The claim
that the Reconstruction Amendments limit state immunity allegedly conferred by the
eleventh amendment was presented in an amicus brief by the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc.
97. Id. at 1366-67 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 1370 (Marshall, J., joined by Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 1368 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
99. King v.Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).
100. 94 S.Ct. at 1366-67 (Douglas,J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 1770 (Marshall, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring). "While conducting
an assistance program for the needy . . . the State . . . has voluntarily subordinated its
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waiver is assuredly closer to the concept of national supremacy of article VI
than the "league-of-sovereign-states" brand of federalism implicit in the Edelman majority opinion.
The federal regulations promulgated by HEW likewise point to the
amenability of the states to suit. The regulations authorize federal financial
participation in "retroactive... corrective payments" made "to carry out hearing decisions.
or to extend the benefit of a hearing decision or court order
to others in the same situation as those directly affected by the decision or
order." 10 2 But deference to asserted state fiscal interests by the Edelman Court
prevailed over the substantial respect generally accorded rulemaking by the
administrative agency charged with enforcement of a federal statute. 03 The
Edelman majority declared that "this retroactive award of monetary relief
[described by the Court of Appeals] as a form of 'equitable restitution' is in
practical effect ... an award of damages against the State."'1 4 A substantial
portion of any award would, of course, be satisfied through matching federal
funds for wrongfully withheld past payments.' 05 Also, the award sought in
Edelman was compensatory and would have been limited to wrongfully withheld assistance payments that are a "matter of statutory entitlement for persons
106 .
qualified to receive them."'
Edelman substantially lessens the accountability of state agencies to welfare
applicants and recipients. State hearing officers are generally restricted to
awarding relief for wrongful denial of benefits under applicable state policies;
they lack authority to hold state policies inconsistent with federal regulations
and to afford appropriate individual or class relief. When state policies are
attacked for alleged inconsistency with federal law or regulations, the cutomary practice for legal services attorneys - and it is they who have been
responsible for virtually all of the litigation under the categorical assistance
programs - is to file a claim for relief in the federal court.' 07 If judicial relief
.is barred prior to entry of a decree, the principle of accountability1Os is sub- stantially eroded, and the most effective sanction for state nonconformity. with
'federal .law and regulations is undermined.
Thd state immunity postulate of Employees and-Edelman and the national
supremacy premise of Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent in Employees embody
sentiments as old as the nation itself.le 9 The Court in Employees and Edelman,
sovereignty in this matter to that of the Federal Government, and agreed to comply with the
conditions imposed by Congress upon the expenditure of federal funds." Id. at 1871-72.
102., See 45 C.F.R. §§205.10(b)(2), (3) (1973). The Court did not regard the adoption of
regulations by HEW as determinative of the constitutional issues presented in Edelman. 94

S. Ct. at 1261-62 n.17.
103. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S..424, 433-34 (1971).

104. 94 S. Ct. at 1358. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974), the Chief Justice
cited Edelman as authority for the proposition that the "doctrine of Ex parte Young is of no
aid t6 a plaintiff seeking damages from the public treasury."
105. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
106. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 951, 262 (1970).

107. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not necessary. See Damico v. California,
389 U.S. 416, 417 (1967). Cf. McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
108. See Goldberg v, Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967).
109., The political rhetoric and historical scholarship on this theme are probably as
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in effect, subordinates the supremacy of federal law to nineteenth century
doctrines of state sovereignty. What is most important is that the Court's decisions be understood by all to reflect a concept of federalism that defers
national supremacy and individual rights to asserted state fiscal interests.
In both Employees and Edelman the Court held an unconsenting state
immune from suit by one of its citizens. Although such action is not prohibited
by the language of the eleventh amendment,110 the judicial gloss to that effect,
stemming from Hans v. Louisiana"' was found persuasive. 112 However, in his
Employees dissent Mr. Justice Brennan pointed the way for the Court to avoid
the state immunity bar while leaving Hans and its progeny1n 3 undisturbed.
Suppose, as he contends, that these cases accord "to nonconsenting states only
a nonconstilutional immunity from suit by its own citizens." 4 State fiscal
voluminous as any in the pre.Civil War period. Curiously, the eleventh amendment has
received relatively little attention from legal scholars. See, e.g., Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1060 (1946); Cullison,
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 5 HOUSTON L. REV. 1 (1967); Guthrie, The
Eleventh Article of Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 8 COLUM. L. REV.
183 (1908); Hyneman, Judicial Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 2 IND. L.J. 371
(1927); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. Rzv.
1 (1963).
110. The text of the eleventh amendment is set out in note 14 supra.
111. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
112. In reaching its result, the Court appears to have interpreted history to suit a preconceived state immunity posture. A comprehensive study addressed specifically to the validity
of the historical premise for the Court's state immunity postulate in Employees and Edelman would he of interest. The important constitutional questions raised in the concurring
opinion of Justice Marshall and the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in Employees
deserve thorough attention by legal historians. As Justice Brennan observed: "None has yet
offered, however, a persuasively principled explanation for ... [the Hans] conclusion in the
face of the wording of the [eleventh] Amendment .... [T]he question whether the Eleventh
Amendment constitutionalized sovereign immunity . . . should, therefore, be regarded as
open, or at least ripe for further consideration." Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 310 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Some recent inquiries tend to negate the Court's historical premise in Employees
and Edelman. See, e.g., C. JAcoBs, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMsiUNrry (1972);
A. KELLY & W.

HARBISON, TIE AMIERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT

(1970);

R. MORRIS, JOHN JAY; THE NATiON AND THE COURT (1967). The question comes very close
to being a normative one incapable of dispositive historical or other rational proof. Since
both nationalist and state-rights philosophies of citizenship and politics can be found in
the Constitution, the members of the Court, regardless of their predilections on the national
supremacy-state sovereignty issue, can derive substantial historical support consistent with
their respective federalism postulates.
113. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946); Ford Motor Co.
v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 320 U.S. 47
(1940). These cases [a]t most . . . reflect the unique considerations that surround federal
judicial interference with enforcement of state tax law and the underlying policy of the
federal courts not to decide these cases where an adequate remedy is otherwise available."
Brief for Respondents at 28, Edelman v. Jordan, 44 S. Ct. 1347 (1974); cf. Burford v. Sun
Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Employees and Edelman, in contrast to Kennecott, Ford, and
Read, present important questions of federal policy in which state law is largely irrelevant.
114. Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. at 313 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Marshall, with whom Mr. Justice
Stewart joined, concurring in Employees, asserts that the "constitutional impediment to the
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interests would be protected unless they conflicted with national interests,
which should be preferred under the supremacy clause. Moreover, such construction would enable the Court to reconcile the "retroactive portion" of the
district court's decree in Edelman with the Hans line of cases. Since those cases
involved federal judicial interference with enforcement of state tax laws,
Edelman, which arises under the commerce power, 115 could be distinguished
because it does not involve a claim based upon special state interests. Alternatively, it could be argued that lower federal courts lack jurisdiction under the
United States Code, volume 28, section 1331, of challenges to state tax legislation (or state laws impairing the obligation of contract) because such claims
"arise under" state law rather than the Constitution or laws of the United
States. The "well pleaded complaint" rule" 6 would thus defeat original fedexercise of the federal judicial power in a case such as this is not the Eleventh Amendment
but Article III of our Constitution." Id. at 291. The language of article III does not support
Mr. Justice Marshall's construction. When one considers article III in the context of the
fastidiousness of the framers in their use of language, the many proposed drafts of a judicial
article and the substantial discussion and debate concerning the judicial article, it is obvious
that inferences construing article III contrary to its express terms should be strongly disfavored. Moreover, the predominance of creditor interests among the leading proponents of
the judicial article at the Constitutional Convention and their equally strong commitment to
the sanctity of contract weigh against the Marshall position. See Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
(2 DaU.) 419 (1793). See also HIsTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrED STATES 196-412
(J. Goebel ed. 1971).
115. See Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 319-20 n.7 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brank, 303 U.S. 95 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting). This distinction was urged by justice
Brennan who contended that state immunity was waived by the plan of the Constitutional
Convention "in respect to enumerated powers granted by the States to the National Government, such as the commerce power ... [but that] there was no surrender in respect to selfimposed prohibitions, as in the case of the Contract Clause." 411 U.S. at 319-20 n.7 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). In Mr. Justice Brennan's view, the Contract Clause is not among the "supreme
federal powers" but is "simply a prohibition self-imposed by the States upon themselves and
it granted Congress no powers of enforcement by means of subjecting the States to suit .... "
rd. Thus, judicial recognition of states' immunity claims is appropriate under the Contract
Clause but not under the Commerce Clause or any other enumerated power of Congress.
Mr. Justice Marshall, conversely, believes that state waiver of common law immunity for
the purposes of the enumerated powers of article I, §8 "would seem to compel the conclusion
that the States had also pro tanto surrendered their common law immunity with respect to
any claim under the Contract Clause." Id. at 293 n.8 (Marshall, J., joined by Stewart, J.,
concurring). Mr. Justice Marshall attacked the Brennan position by observing that it is "a
strange hierarchy that would provide a greater opportunity to enforce congressionally created
rights than constitutionally guaranteed rights in federal court." Id. Mr. Justice Marshall's
argument has impressive historical credentials. See, e.g., 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES 486 (2d ed.
1836) where James Wilson advised the Pennsylvania ratification convention: "If only the
following lines were inserted in this Constitution, I think it would be worth our adoption:
'No state shall hereafter emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and silver coin a
tender in payment of debts; pass any bills of attainder ex post facto law or law impairing
the obligation of contracts.'" (emphasis in original). The Brennan position, however, has the
virtue of leaving state immunity largely intact without undermining national supremacy.
116. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). Compare Smith v.
Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting), with Louisville &
N.R.R., supra. To defeat jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1343(3) (1970), however, would re-
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eral jurisdiction. Either distinction would permit enforcement of preemptive
federal legislation without unnecessarly jeopardizing state fiscal interests. When
a state participates in an activity subject to federal regulation or in a cooperative program funded in large part by federal monies, its common law
immunity should be subordinated to supreme federal law.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

A conceptual flamework for determining the extent of the judicial power
of the United States was offered by the Court in Cohens v. Virginia. 117 Chief
Justice Marshall reasoned that article III had extended the judicial power of
the United States to two classes of cases. In the first category "jurisdiction depends on the character of the cause, whoever may be the parties."118 Federal
jurisdiction of cases according to the character of the cause "comprehends 'all
cases in law or equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United
States, and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority.' "119
Thus, the jurisdiction is coextensive with the federal judicial power and any
exception must be "implied against the express words of the article."120
The second class of cases described by Chief Justice Marshall "depends entirely on the character of the parties." Federal jurisdiction based upon the
characterof the parties under article III comprehends " 'controversies between
two or more states, between a state and citizens of another state' 'and between
a state and foreign citizens or subjects.' "121 As to the second class of cases, it is
"entirely unimportant what may be the subject of controversy."122
A corollary of Chief Justice Marshall's classification is that "a case arising
under the constitution or laws of the United States is cognizable in the courts
of the Union whoever may be the parties to that case."12 3 The judicial department is "authorized" to decide all cases of every description, arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States.124 From "this general grant of
jurisdiction" in which jurisdiction depends on the character of the cause, no
exception is made of those cases in which a state may be a party. 125 The constitutional policies supporting jurisdiction in Cohens are applicable as well in
Employees and Edelman. They are:
[T]he situation of the government of the Union and of a state, in relation to each other; the nature of our constitution; the subordination of
quire a construction that a claim under the Contract Clause is not a "right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution" within the meaning of §1343(3).
117. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). The Supreme Court "gives particular weight to
pronouncements of Chief Justice Marshall upon the meaning of his contemporaries in framing the Constitution." 411 U.S. at 313-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821) (emphasis added).
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 383.
124. Id. at 382 (emphasis added).
125. Id.
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the state governments to that constitution; the great purpose for which
jurisdiction over all cases arising under the constitution and
laws of the
United States, is confided to the judicial department .... 126
The purpose for extending federal jurisdiction under article III to all cases
based upon the characterof the cause was, of course, to uphold the supremacy
of federal law. A contrary construction would "prostrate. . .the government
and its laws at the feet of every state in the Union."' 27 Do not Employees and
Edelman, in fact, prostrate federal law?
In Employees and Edelman the Court declined to consider Chief Justice
Marshall's commentary on the dual nature of federal jurisdiction. Even Mr.
Justice Brennan appears to have been misled by a recent historical study of the
eleventh amendment, 128 which argued that Chief Justice Marshall's statements
in Cohens led to a "paradox." The alleged inconsistency is that a state citizen,
who has a voice in the state legislature, could enforce a federally protected
right, while a noncitizen would enjoy neither a legislative nor a judicial
remedy for the same right.
Upon close scrutiny, however, the alleged paradox disappears. The eleventh
amendment must be understood as limiting the judicial power of article III
only with.respect to those cases to which jurisdiction is extended by the character of the parties; the eleventh amendment has absolutely no effect upon
federal judicial power as it relates to jurisdiction based upon the character of
the cause. This construction is the only plausible one for several reasons. First,
the eleventh amendment by its express terms extends only to cases that come
under federal judicial power because of the character of the parties. Cohens
is explicit authority for the proposition that the eleventh amendment did not
affect cases to which the judicial power of article III was extended because of
the characterof the cause. Restrictions upon the extent of the federal judicial
power should not be favored. The principle of strict construction is especially
appropriate, where, as here, the restriction upon federal jurisdiction would
frustrate "the great purpose" that federal question jurisdiction was intended to
serve-- the supremacy of federal law.'"s
126. Id..
127. Id. at 385.
128. Mr. Justice Brennan accepted as true the assertion that "Chief Justice Marshall's
statement of the principle in Cohen v. Virginia, created a paradox: 'a citizen with a claim
under the Constitution or federal law against his own state might sue in federal courts, while
a citizen of another state or an alien, parties exercising much less, if any influence upon the
government of the state for its beneficence would be denied a federal remedy."' C. JAcoBs,
THE ELEVEN=- AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNrrY 91 (1972); 411 U.S. at 313.
129. The rule of construction in Employees and Edelman should have been as it was in

Cohens: "M-o.construe the constitution as to give effect to both provisions, as far as it is
possible to reconcile them, and not to permit their seeming repugnancy to destroy each other.

We must... construe them as to preserve the true intent and meaning of the instrument."
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 393. Applying such a rule of construction, it is plain that the eleventh
amendment limitation upon federal judicial power relating to the character of the parties
would not affect jurisdiction based upon cases relating to the character of the cause. In
cases in which jurisdiction is "founded entirely on the character of the parties .... [t]he
character of the parties is everything, the nature of the case nothing. ... [Where] jurisdic-
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Cohens is almost as old as the Union itself and is the lynchpin upon which
the supremacy clause depends. Overruling Cohens would, of course, be unthinkable. What tile Court did in Hans and has done again in Employees and
Edelman is to undermine the logic of Cohens without full consideration of the
implications of its action.
The fact that federal question jurisdiction was not vested in federal courts
of original jurisdiction by the Judiciary Act of 1789130 suggests that concern
over federal question jurisdiction could not possibly have been the object of
the remedial intent of the eleventh amendment. Moreover, since the eleventh
amendment does not preclude actions between two or more states, its purpose
was "not to maintain the sovereignty of the state from the degradation supposed to attend a compulsory appearance before the tribunal of the Nation."13'
Its purpose was, rather, to protect a state from "persons who might probably
be its creditors."' 32 The interest of states in protecting their fiscs from suits by
citizens of other states and foreign states is distinct from the equally compelling policies that support federal judicial power in federal question cases.
tion is founded entirely on the character of the case .... the nature of the case is everything, the character of the parties nothing." Id.
130. For the legislative history of the Judiciary Act of 1789, see Warren, New Light in
the History of the FederalJudiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49 (1923).
131. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 406. Since the eleventh amendment "does not comprehend
controversies between two or more states, or between a state and a foreign state .... [w]e
must ascribe the amendment then to some other cause than the dignity of a state." But see
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (eleventh amendment construed
to bar suits against states by foreign states). Monaco is inconsistent with the views prevailing
at the Constitutional Convention and among Federalists generally on the sanctity of contract
and upon the necessity of state respect for contract rights as the only means of securing
state credit. It is not necessary, however, to reject state immunity as asserted in Monaco for
the Court to decline to extend the eleventh amendment to cases such as Employees and
Edelman. See notes 115-116 supra and accompanying text.
132. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 406. "There was not much reason to fear that foreign or sister
states would be creditors to any considerable amount." Id.
A preliminary search by the writer into the early reported cases of several states confirms
Chief Justice Marshall's hypothesis. The early state reports are filled with actions by creditors
upon public debts. See, e.g., Stanley's Ex'r v. Hawkins, 1 N.C. (1 Martin) 36 (1791); Executors
of Fowl v. Todd, 1 S.C. (1 Bay) 176 (1791). The states were equally concerned with avoiding
review of state confiscation acts (luring the war with Britain. See Bayard v. Singleton, I N.C.
(1 Martin) 5 (1787), where it was held that an act of the Assembly confiscating property of
alien enemies by name was effective to vest valid title to the property in the state and subsequent purchasers from the state. On the decision in Bayard, twenty-seven other similar
cases were all swept off the docket. See also Porter v. Dunn, 1 S.C. (1 Bay) 53 (1787), where
the court upheld "Sumter's law" under which the Assembly in 1784 granted General Sumter
and his officers authority to seize "loyalist" property, real or personal, and vest title to same
in his men in lieu of pay.
Under article III of the Constitution and under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Supreme
Court was vested with original jurisdiction over an array of potential claims against states
by citizens of other states, foreign creditors, aliens, or loyalists.
Some of the rights asserted against the states had been secured by the treaties of 1783 and
1795 with Great Britain. See S. BEMIS, A DIPLOmATIc HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 101-10
(1955). For an account of the property-oriented Federalist perspective, which underlay article
III, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the dreadfully unpopular treaty of 1795, "Jay's Treaty,"
see R. MORRIS, JOHN JAY, THE NATION AND THE COURT (1967).
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A proper regard for the different policies that article III and the eleventh
amendment were intended to serve would allow the Court to reconcile and
honor both. Neither Employees nor Edelman can be justified by a policyoriented construction of the eleventh amendment in relationship to article III.
The opinion of Justice Marshall in Employees1 3 presents more problems
than it solves. Mr. Justice Marshall admits the right of individuals to enforce
FLSA claims against the states in state courts, but wishes to avoid the tension
"inherent in making one sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the
other."'134 Denial of original federal jurisdiction, however, should give rise to
even more acute federal-state tension. Forcing state courts to bear the additional cost of hearing federal claims does not appear likely to reduce federalstate tension. Moreover, friction frequently develops when state judges are
forced to hear federal statutory claims over which they lack special competence
or interest. That the denial of a federal forum is not inherent in our system is
obvious from a careful reading of Cohens. It has not been shown that the federal-state tension resulting from Supreme Court review under the United States
Code, volume 28, section 1257, is any less than the tension generated by federal review in courts of original jurisdiction. In addition, there are important
practical reasons for permitting original federal jurisdiction of FLSA claims
against the states. Original federal jurisdiction secures federal claims against
possible bias in the state factfinding process and substantially lessens the pressure upon the appellate docket of the Supreme Court. Failure to give original
cognizance of federal claims to federal courts would impose a "correspondent
necessity for leaving the door of appeal as wide as possible" and "an unrestrained course to appeals . . . [is] a source of public and private inconvenience."' 35 Thus, it is questionable whether the assumed diminution of
tension outweighs the increased burden upon the Court's appellate docket and
possible bias in state factfinding.
The construction of article III and the eleventh amendment urged here
could have been reconciled with Hans and its progeny until the Court's decisions in Employees and Edelman. A constitutional immunity of states from
suit by their own citizens, according to the Brennan construction, is not necessary to the holding in Hans."36 To the extent that Hans elevated state immunity in federal question cases to a constitutional status, it is inconsistent
with the legislative history of article III and the eleventh amendment and
deserves to be overruled.
Hans v. LouisianaRECONSIDERED
Hans was an action brought against Louisiana by a citizen of that state to
recover the amount of certain interest coupons annexed to state bonds. An
133. 411 U.S. at 287 (Marshall, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 294.
135. See TE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 486 (W. Kendall & G. Carey ed. 1966). See also 1
REcoRDs, supra note 32, at 124.
136. Mr. Justice Brennan rejects "the premise that Hans may be read as a constitutional
decision." 411 U.S. at 319 n.7.
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amendment to the Louisiana constitution had repudiated the state's obligation
to pay this claim. Jurisdiction was asserted under the Act of 1875 upon an
alleged state impairment of the obligation of contract. The Court in Hans
thought it "anomalous" and "startling" if "in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, a state may be sued in the federal courts by
its own citizens, though it cannot be sued for a like cause of action by the
citizens of other states or of a foreign state." 13 7 The Hans Court, thus, misconstrued the eleventh amendment by assuming that it applies to cases in
which jurisdiction is vested by the character of the cause as well as the character of the parties. If the eleventh amendment restricts only cases in which
jurisdiction is founded upon the character of the parties, the "anomaly" vanishes; citizens of other states and foreign states would not be prevented from
bringing suit against a state when jurisdiction is founded upon the character
of the cause. Allowing suit against a state "in the federal courts ... [when the

state does not allow itself] to be sued in its own courts," 13 8 is another result the
Hans Court thought "anomalous" and "startling." But when a supremacy question is raised, the result is no more "anomalous" or "startling" than the concept of national supremacy itself. Nor does Hollingsworth v. Virginia19 support the Court's construction of the eleventh amendment in Hans, a claim
made by the Hans Court.140 In Hollingsworth the Court held that the eleventh
amendment prevented "any jurisdiction, in any case, past or future, in which
a state was sued by the citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of
any foreign state."141 The phrase "any case" in Hollingsworth was obviously

intended to comprehend "any case in which jurisdiction is based upon the
character of the parties." To contend otherwise strains credulity, since there
was no original federal question jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act of 1789
then in force.
The Court suggested in Hans that the enactment of the eleventh amendment cast doubt upon whether Chisolm v. Georgia,142 which permitted a suit
against a state by a noncitizen, was based upon a sound interpretation of the
Constitution at the time it was decided.143 To support its view that Chisolm
was improperly decided the Hans Court made reference only to the following
data: the opinion of Mr. Justice Iredell in Chisolm, quotations from Hamilton's Federalist,Number 8 1, and statements made by James Madison and John
Marshall at the Virginia ratification convention.
The references to Hamilton's Federalist, Number 81, in Hans do not support the Court's decision in either Employees or Edelman. Rather, Hamilton's

137. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
138. Id.
139. 3 U.S. (3Dali.) 378 (1798).
140. 134 U.S. at 11-12.
141. 3 U.S. (3Dali.) at 378.
142. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
143. 3 U.S. (3Dali.) at 12. In his brief concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan declared
that he thought Chisolm was a "sound interpretation of the constitution as that instrument
then was" and chided the Court because its comments on Chisolm "are not necessary to the
determination of the present case." Id. at 21.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss2/3

24

Le Clercq: State Immunity and Federal Judical Power--Retreat from National S

197

STATE IMMUNITY AND FEDERAL POWER

remarks14 4 provide support for the application of the nonconstitutional doctrine of state immunity, which Mr. Justice Brennan urged in explanation of
Hans.
The statements by Madison and Marshall that article III only conferred
federal jurisdiction over cases brought by a state are not conclusive. The main
opponents to the Constitution at the Virginia Convention apparently put little
faith in the assurances of Madison and Marshall. 145 From the perspective of
the debates at the Philadelphia Convention and in the context of remarks
made in other state ratifying conventions, one is hard put not to question the
intellectual honesty of the concessions made by Madison and Marshall at the
-Virginia Convention and-siezed upon by the Court in Hans. There can be no
doubt that many others at Philadelphia and in the state conventions interpreted article III literally. For example, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, one
of the most prominent legal scholars at the Philadelphia Convention and one
who had an important role in drafting article III, discussed the federal
judicial power at'length in the Pennsylvania ratification convention. 4 6 It is
readily apparent that Wilson comprehended the. judicial power of article IIII
to include cases against states brought by citizens of other states and foreign
states, citizens, or subjects. Wilson contended that "impartiality" was the leading feature of a federal forum: "[W]hen a citizen has a controversy with another state, there ought to be a tribunal where both parties may stand on a
just and equal footing.' 147 Wilson recognized that the clause vesting diversity
jurisdiction and making states amenable to suits by foreign states, citizens, or
subjects "will occasion more doubt than any other part."'14 The purpose of
extending the judicial power of courts of the United States to diversity cases,
including controversies to which a state is a party, was to restore public and
private credit, to promote manufacturing, and to enhance interstate commercial transactions.' 49
144. In THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 131, Hamilton wrote that it is "inherent in
the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent." (emphasis in original). He continued: "Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this
immunity in the plan of the convention, it [immunity] will remain with the states." Id. at
548 (emphasis added). The delegation of power to Congress under article I, §8, under the
"plan of the convention," necessitates a surrender of state immunity. See note 115 supra.
145. One of the leading opponents of the Constitution, Patrick Henry, argued that the
Madison-Marshall argument is: "[P]erfectly incomprehensible .... [Me says that the state
may be plaintiff only. If gentlemen pervert the most clear expressions, and the usual meaning of the language of the people, there is an end of all argument. What says the paper?
That it shall have cognizance of controversies between a state and citizens of another state,
without discriminating between plaintiff and defendant." 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES 543 (1836).
Cf. id. at 527 (Mr. Mason of Virginia).
146. 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATEs 489-94 (1836).
147. Id. at 491.
148. Id.
149. Id. Wilson observed that the nation needed: "[T]o restore . . . public . . . [and]
private credit, [so] that foreigners, as well as ourselves, have a just and impartial tribunal to
which they may resort[.] I would ask how a merchant must feel to have his property lie at
the mercy of the laws of Rhode Island .... How will a creditor feel who has his debts at
the mercy of tender laws in other states?
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The views expressed by Wilson at the Pennsylvania Convention plainly
expressed his intent at the Philadelphia Convention with regard to the extent
of federal jurisdiction according to the character of the parties, and his statements deserve special respect because of the preeminent role he played in
drafting article 111.150 In contrast, the impetus in favor of federal question
jurisdiction lay in the perceived need for a national government strong
enough to "defend itself against the encroachments from the states ....

[and to

be] paramount to the state constitutions."151 Lack of federal supremacy was
among the chief defects that the Constitution was intended to remedy.
In Chisolm v. Georgia s2 the majority of the Justices construed article III
consistently with its language and legislative intent. Mr. Justice Blair observed correctly that the policy supporting the amenability of states to suit
lay in the idea that "no state in the union should by withholding justice have
"[We cannot] extend our manufactures and our commerce . . . unless a proper security is
provided for the regular discharge of contracts [and] ....
unless we give power deciding
upon those contracts to the general government.
"I will mention, further, an object that I take to be of particular magnitude ....
the
improvement of our domestic navigation, the instrument of trade between the several states.
Private credit, which fell to decay from the destruction of public credit, by a too inefficient
general government will be restored; and this valuable intercourse among ourselves must give
an increase to those useful improvements that will astonish the world." Id. at 491-92 (emphasis in original).
150. See 2 REcoRDS, supra note 32, at 129-75. Much of the work on the Constitution was
done by the Committee of Detail. The first draft of the Committee proposed federal jurisdiction for two separate classes of cases. Jurisdiction was conferred upon "[c]ases arising under
the Laws passed by the general Legislature." Id. at 132-33. This was the progenitor of the
clause conferring jurisdiction according to the character of the cause. Jurisdiction was also
extended "to such other Questions as involve national Peace and Harmony." Id. at 133. This
clause was the ancestor of jurisdiction according to the character of the parties. The fourth
draft of the Committee of Detail had begun to define cases "involving the national peace and
harmony" to include diversity jurisdiction; "disputes between a State and a Citizen or Citizens
of another State" (a marginal note in the handwriting of John Rutledge) and to "disputes
. . . in which subjects or citizens of other countries are concerned." Id. at 147. The ninth
draft, found among the Wilson papers, was in Wilson's handwriting with emendations in
Rutledge's hand. The phrase "national peace and harmony" had given way to a specific
enumeration of cases in language very close to that of the Constitution itself. In the ninth
draft, jurisdiction of cases according to the character of the parties, in addition to cases
affecting ambassadors, was extended "to Controversies between <States, - except those wh.
regard Jurisdn or Territory, - betwn> a State and a Citizen or Citizens of another State,
between Citizens of different States and between <a State or the Citizens> (of any of the
States) <thereof> and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. (Parts in parenthesis were
crossed out in original; emendations by Rutledge are in angle brackets.) Id. at 173. John
Rutledge delivered the ninth draft of the Committee of Detail to the Convention on
August 7, 1787, a printed copy being at the same time furnished to each member. Id. at 177,
186. Mr. Sherman subsequently moved successfully to extend the jurisdiction to include suits
between Citizens of the same state claiming land grant from different states. Id. at 431-32. No
other substantive changes were made with regard to jurisdiction according to the character
of the parties. Jurisdiction according to the character of the cause was subsequently extended to cases arising under the Constitution and treaties as well as under laws of the
United States. See id. at 432 (document in Mason papers); 600 (reports of the Committee of
Style); 660 (article III of the Constitution).
151. See I RECORDS, supra note 32, at 19.
152. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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it in its power to embroil the whole confederacy in disputes." 153 By adopting
the Constitution, each state "agreed to be amenable to the judicial power of
the United States . . . [and] in that respect, [has] given up her right of sov-

ereignty." 5 4 Mr. Justice Wilson's opinion in ChisoIm reiterated the concern
for commercial stability that he had pursued at the Philadelphia Convention
in drafting article III.15 Chief Justice Jay's opinion was predicated upon the
responsibility of the United States to foreign nations for the conduct of each
state, the performance of treaties, and the inexpediency of referring such
questions to the courts of delinquent states. 58 The opinions of Justices Blair,
Cushing, Wilson, and Jay in Chisolm mirror the concern of the Philadelphia
Convention and of the Federalists over the security of commercial transactions
and private property. 57
The enactment of the eleventh amendment negated a portion of the judicial power of article !II. Suits between states and citizens of other states or of
foreign countries - cases based on the characterof the parties- were no longer
cognizable by federal courts. The sentiment in the country at large, as the
Court observed in Hans, did not coincide with the overriding concerns of the
Federalists for the sanctity of private property and the obligation of contract.
The people were obviously unwilling to sanction respect for private property
or contracts to the extent of authorizing suits by loyalists whose property had
been confiscated during the Revolution, the treaties of 1783 and 1795 to the
contrary notwithstanding. Nor were the states willing to submit to suit on
claims arising from vast debts incurred during the Revolutionary and postRevolutionary period (most of which under Hamilton's plan were assumed
by the federal government). In short, the eleventh amendment applies only to
two classes of cases - suits against states by citizens of other states and suits
against states by citizens of foreign states 58 - and in both cases jurisdiction is
conferred according to the character of the parties. But the eleventh amendment could not have been intended to affect the federal judicial power as it
relates to a federal question jurisdiction - jurisdiction founded upon the
characterof the cause. The present Court by accepting the constitutional dicta
of Hans is exalting a late nineteenth century revisionist construction over an
interpretation that emerges from the Philadelphia Convention and a consideration of contemporaneous Federalist policies.
The Court can honor not only the letter but the spirit of the eleventh
amendment- its alleged unwritten postulates -by recognizing a nonconstitutional state immunity in federal courts whenever the supreme federal powers
153.

Id. at 451.

154. Id. at 432 (opinion of Vilson, J.).
155. Id. at 456.
156. Id. at 474 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
157. Chief Justice Jay was not prepared to extend the rule of Chisolm to "bills of credit
issued before the Constitution was established, and which were issued and received on the
faith of the state ....
"Id. at 479.
158. This is consistent with the understanding of article III during the 1790's. Thus,
Chief Justice Jay in Chisolm observed that the judicial power of the United States extended
to "ten descriptions of cases." Id. at 475. The eleventh amendment did no more than negate
federal jurisdiction for cases comprising the-eighth and tenth of Jay's categories.......
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of article I, section 8, are not at stake. States would thus continue to enjoy
federal immunity relating to matters of state taxation, bonds, and contracts.
But where matters of national supremacy are at stake, as in Employees and
Edelman, a proper respect for the legislative history of article III and the
supremacy clause demand that the Court subordinate conflicting states fiscal
interests to the overriding national interest in the supremacy of federal law.
CONCLUSION

The revisionist posture of the Court in Employees and Edelman misconceives the nature of the judicial power conferred by article III. The Court's
holdings extend and distort the eleventh amendment to serve policies for
which it was never intended. The decisions are all the more unfortunate because they retreat from the earlier position taken by the Court in Parden. The
Court's reference in Edelman to the statement of Mr. Justice Brandeis on the
limited applicability of stare decisis in constitutional matters'5 9 suggests that
additional revisions of previous decisions in the social welfare area may be
forthcoming. The Court's expressed "pursuit of harmonious federalism" in
Employees and its implicit search for the same goal in Edelman threaten to
strike a new balance in American federalism more deferential to asserted
doctrines of state sovereignty. Such deference inevitably would take a heavy
toll of values enhanced by the supremacy clause. When the Court denies individual enforcement of federally secured rights in the federal courts, the value
of the asserted rights diminishes considerably. Nor does the American experience provide a basis for the hypothesis that a policy of unbridled voluntarism
will generally result in anything short of persistent deprivation or dilution of
federally secured individual rights. In an age in which individual rights are
most in need of judicial protection against degradation by large bureaucracies,
be they state, federal, or private- the trend of Employees and Edelman should
be viewed with concern. The Court acknowledges the propriety of "'the process of trial and error.., in the judicial function.' "160 One can only hope that
the Court will not extend the errors of Employees and Edelman to undermine
further the principle of federal supremacy and the equally important principle
of administrative accountability to the individual. The nonconstitutional state
immunity doctrine urged by Mr. Justice Brennan in Employees, has obvious
advantages over the opinions rendered by the Court and Justices Marshall and
Stewart. The Brennan construction is consistent with the language and legislative intent of the eleventh amendment and article III. Most importantly, it
would preserve national supremacy with respect to the paramount federal
powers of Congress under article I, section 8, and the Reconstruction Amendments while shielding against federal intrusion upon state interests outside the
scope of the federal powers.
Although Edelman precludes monetary relief retrospective to the wrongful
denial of benefits by state officers, the eleventh amendment apparently provides
no protection to state officers who disobey valid decrees of federal courts. 161
159.
160.
161.

Edelman v. Jordan, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 1359 n.14 (1974).
Id.
Rodriguez v. Swank, 496 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1974).
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Thus, in Swank, the Supreme Court declined to review a Seventh Circuit order
upholding a federal district court's civil contempt order, effective February 1,
1973, and designed to bring about compliance with a 1970 injunction. The
district court order awarded 100 dollars in compensatory damages in addition
to regular benefits to Illinois AFDC applicants whose applications were pending more than thirty days through no fault of their own. Swank places a
premium on early filing and suggests that the race to the courthouse may be
the surest way for attorneys to avoid the deleterious impact of Edelman.
Eleventh amendment claims have been asserted in several pedtion for
certiorari presently pending in the Supreme Court.16 2 The most significant
eleventh amendment claims presently pending disposition on the certiorari
docket involve the validity of awards of attorneys' feesl 63 and costs- against
the state - a matter of substantial practical importance both to the practicing
bar and to special interest groups acting. as "private attorneys general." Although the, appropriateness of an award of attorneys' fees or costs. in the face
'of an eleventh amendment challenge is beyond the-:scope of this article, it is
apparent that the construction of eleventh -amendment- urged here -would:pqt
preclude an award of attorneys fees65 or costs under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 39 in federal question cases.18 6 Whatever merit an eleventh amendment defense may have as a bar to federal jurisdiction based upon the character of the parties, it is submitted that the eleventh amendment is not
relevant to cases arising under the federal question jurisdiction. As to federal
question cases, state fiscal interests are adequately protected by the proper exercise of equitable discretion in the federal courts. A constitutional barrier is
not needed to insure respect for comity or the common sense of our nation's
federalism.
M

162. See, e.g., Department of Human Resources v. Burnham,
F.2d
(5th Cir. 1974),
petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3459 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1975) (whether federal district court,
consistent with the eleventh amendment, can entertain suit by private individuals that would
require state to reorder priorities and increase the level of fiscal support for therapeutic or
curative psychiatric treatment it provides in its mental institutions); Vargas v. Trainor, 508
F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 1454 (1975) (applicability of eleventh amendment to order allegedly requiring retroactive payment of state funds under Supplemental
Security Income Program).
163. Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W.
3319 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1974); Jordan v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974) petition for cert.
filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3299 -(U.S. Oct. 9, 1974); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d
Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W.-3366 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1974); Citizens To Preserve
Overton Park, Inc v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed sub
nom. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Smith, 43 U.S.L.W. 3418 (U.S. Dec. 17,
1974). Compare Sims v. Amos, 336 F. Supp. 924 (M.D. Ala.), 340 F. Supp. 691 (judgment -on
bill for costs and attorney's fees), aff'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972); Jordan v. Fusari, 496 F.2d 646
(2d Cir. 1974); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Cates v. Collier,
489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972), af0'd,
488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973).
164. Boston Chapter NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1928-29 (Ist Cir. 1974),
petition for cert. filed sub nom. Commissioners & Directors of Civil Serv. y. Boston Chapter
NAACP, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 3429 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1974).
165. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973). See also King & Plater, supra note 19.
166. See Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70 (1927).
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